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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs,
Case No. 960271-CA
BRADLEY C. DAVIS and
HOLLY H. HYATT,
Defendants and Appellants.

Priority No. 2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (e) (1996) (appeals for a court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first
degree felony).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
(a) Whether the observations of Sergeant Evans rose to
the level of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity?
(b) Whether Agent Eckman's Search Team had reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to search the premises of Mr. Davis
and Ms. Hyatt?

(c) Whether the Fourth Amendment waiver in Mr. Davis1
probationary agreement violated Article I, section 14 of the Utah
State Constitution?
(d) Whether the exploitation of the Fourth Amendment
waiver in Mr. Davis1 probation agreement violated Ms. Hyatt's
Article I, section 14 Constitutional Right protecting her against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
(e) Whether the trial court committed reversible error
by allowing prisoner testimony without Mr. Davis first being
provided discovery regarding testimony?
(f) Whether the trial court erred when it allowed
testimony to be presented to the jury about alleged illegal
conduct by the defendants on other occasions under the guise of
removing mistake of identity of the defendants?
(g) Whether the misconduct of the prosecutor was
prejudicial to the defendants?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(a) - (b) The observations of Sergeant Evans did not
rise to a level of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity nor
did Agent Eckman's Search Team have reasonable suspicion to
search the premises of Mr. Davis and Ms. Hyatt, therefore the
trial court should have dismissed this matter.
Standard of Review: We conclude that the proper
standard of review to be applied to a trial court
determination of whether a specific set of facts gives
rise to reasonable suspicion is a determination of law
and is reviewable nondeferentially for correctness, as
opposed to being a fact determination reviewable for
clear error. We further conclude that the
reasonable-suspicion legal standard is one that conveys
a measure of discretion to the trial judge when
applying that standard to a given set of facts.
Precisely how much discretion we cannot say, but we
would not anticipate a close, de novo review. On the
2

other hand, a sufficiently careful review is necessary
to assure that the purposes of the reasonable-suspicion
requirement are served.
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
(c - d)

The Fourth Amendment waiver in Mr. Davis1

probationary agreement violated Article I, section 14 of the Utah
State Constitution for both co-defendants.
Standard of Review: In reviewing a trial court's
determination that reasonable suspicion justified a
Fourth Amendment search or seizure, we apply two
different standards of review—one to the trial court's
factual findings and the other to its legal
conclusions. The trial court's factual findings
underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress evidence are examined for clear error. State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). On the other
hand, the standard to be applied to the conclusion of
law, i.e., whether the facts as found give rise to
reasonable suspicion, "is reviewable nondeferentially
for correctness, as opposed to being a fact
determination reviewable for clear error." Pena, 869
P.2d at 939. Nevertheless, the nature of this
particular determination of law allows the trial court
"a measure of discretion . . . when applying that
standard to a given set of facts."
State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994).
(e - g)

The trial court committed reversible error by

allowing prisoner testimony without both co-defendants first
being provided discovery regarding testimony.

This evidence was

admitted regarding the defendant's prior conduct which prejudice
greatly out-weighed its probative value, especially in the light
of the fact that the existence of this individual was never
disclosed to the defendants until during the second day of trial.
Standard of Review: Because the admission of evidence
under Rule 404(b) is a question "of law, it is reviewed
for correctness. However, the trial court's subsidiary
factual determinations should be given deference by the
appellate court and only be overruled when they are
clearly erroneous." State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568
(Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted); see also State v.
Thurman, No. 910494, slip op. at 17-19 n.ll (Utah Jan.
3

7, 1993) (recognizing bifurcated standard when appeals
court reviews underlying factual findings). When
reviewing a trial court's balancing of the
probativeness of a piece of evidence against its
potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403, we
reverse only if the court's decision as a matter of law
"was beyond the limits of reasonability." State v.
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). Improperly
admitted evidence requires reversal of a conviction
only where we conclude there is a "'reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings.1" Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240 (quoting State
v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)).
State v. O'Niel, 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1993).

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah R. Evid. 403
Utah R. Evid. 404
Utah Const, art. I, § 14

Utah Const, art. I, § 7
Utah Const, art. I, § 11
Utah Const, art. I, § 24

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case:
This case arises out of guilty verdicts from a jury

trial in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County, State of
Utah.

II.

Course of the Proceedings:
The court, having original jurisdiction conducted

several pretrial hearings, including a suppression of evidence
hearing.

The Honorable J. Phillip Eves heard the Motion to

Suppress Hearing and denied it.

On December 7-8, 1995, the trial

court judge, the Honorable Robert T. Braithewaite, denied same
motion renewed by the co-Defendants1 counsel.

Then the court

conducted a jury trial that carried through to December 8, 1995.
Therein, the defendants were convicted of all counts alleged in

4

the information.

III. Disposition in Trial Court:
The jury entered a Guilty verdict and the co-Defendants
were sentenced, including Davis1 incarceration in the Utah State
Prison.
IV.

Statement of Facts:
1.

The defendant Davis pled guilty to a charge of theft, a

class A Misdemeanor, in Kane County and was placed on probation
as a result thereof.

Because Mr. Davis lived in Cedar City,

probation was assigned to Iron County.
2.

On November 21, 1994, Sergeant Rick Evans of the Iron

County Sheriff!s Office was in the city of Summit at about 2:00
a.m.

(TT. at 62-64).
3.

He was involved in a surveillance of a residence. (TT.

at 62-64).
4.

While at the location of 100 South on the "backroads of

Summit" Sergeant Evans observed a light brown van bearing South
Dakota license plates drive around the corner and up the street.
(TT. at 62-64).
5.

The van slowed down as though it were going to pull

into the driveway of the residence under surveillance and then it
drove off.
6.

(TT. at 62-64).

He then followed the van to the Sunshine Truck Stop.

(TT. at 62-64).
7.

Sergeant Evans followed the van into the truck stop

then exited his vehicle and approached the driver. (TT. at 6264).
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8.

Sergeant Evans asked the driver who he was to which the

driver replied, "I'm Chick Davis."
9.

(TT. at 62-64).

Questions were then asked about the van and the reason

for Davis' presence in Summit.

His response was that ever since

his son was killed he drives around when he can't sleep.

(TT. at

67-68).
10.

This information was then passed on to other officers,

including Mr. Davis' probation officer, Agent Bob Eckman of Adult
Probation and Parole.
11.

(TT. at 66).

Sometime after the report by Sergeant Evans to Agent

Eckman, Agent Eckman planned to visit Davis.
12.

(TT. at 72).

The purpose of the visitation was to check on Davis'

compliance with the previously imposed extra-judicial terms of
the probation agreement and to follow up suspicions deduced from
Sergeant Evans1 report.
13.

(TT. at 72).

On November 15, 1994, Agent Eckman's search team had

visited the residence belonging to Mr. Davis pursuant to an
extra-judicial modification of Mr. Davis's probation agreement.
14.

A search of Mr. Davis1 and a co-defendant's, Holly

Hyatt, residence and vehicles was conducted.
15.

There was no warrant obtained nor sought at any time

during the search of both defendants' residence or vehicles.
(TT. at 76)
16.

At no time was consent obtained from either Mr. Davis

or Ms. Hyatt to search either the residence or the vehicles.
17.

Through the course of the search, the team discovered

large amounts of drug contraband and paraphernalia.
18.

A motion to suppress evidence was conducted before the

6

Honorable J. Philip Eves on two dates, September 5, 1995 and
October 3, 1995.
19.

The Court denied Mr. Davis1 motion,

As a result, a jury trial was conducted on December 8,

1995 where surprise witness(es) were utilized from the Utah State
Prison, who were not previously disclosed to Mr. Davis or his
counsel.
20.

The conviction included possession of stolen property.

21.

The allegedly stolen property was two electric tools, a

router and a staple gun.
22.

The staple gun was never reported stolen.

23.

There was no testimony that the staple gun had ever

been stolen.
24.

(TT. 385).

The router was reported stolen over one year prior to

the router being found in the defendant's possession.

(TT. at

384).
25.

The router had no serial or identification number or

other mark which would assist anyone in identifying the owner.
(TT. at 383).
26.

The victim further testified that he did not suspect

the defendant of having stolen any of his property.

(TT. at

397).
27.

At the time of the trial in this matter there were two

small bindles of cocaine which were offered as exhibits.
28.

They were the only two items dealing with possession of

cocaine.
29.

The items were not of sufficient quantity to show

possession with intent to distribute.
30.

At the time of the trial in this matter Robert Eckman,
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who was Davis's probation officer, testified that there were two
individuals who pulled up to the front of Defendant's residence
while officers were performing their search of the co-defendant's
residence.
31.

At the preliminary examination in this matter Agent

Eckman testified that the two individuals were Steve Lambert and
Doyle Gosler.
32.

At the hearing for the Motion to Suppress Evidence,

Agent Eckman testified that the two individuals were Steve
Lambert and somebody named Sullivan.
33.

At the time of trial in this matter Agent Eckman

testified that the individuals were Steve Lambert and Danny
Balduck.
34.

The Court allowed Danny Balduck to testify about

numerous occasions (about 15) wherein he claimed to have
purchased controlled substances from the defendant.
35.

The prosecutor argued that Mr. Balduck?s testimony was

to prevent mistake of identity as to the defendant Davis.
36.

At no time in any proceeding, at trial or any of the

hearings which preceded trial was this raised as a defense.
37.

At trial there was no limiting instruction given as the

Court agreed to give as to Danny Balducks's testimony.
38.

That the testimony of Danny Balduck was intended to

prejudice to jury.
39.

There were many officers who testified that they knew

the defendant personally.

There was no chance for a mistake as

to identity.

8

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The co-Defendants were erroneously convicted due to
certain constitutional violations of which are matters of law
where no discretion is deferred to the trial court.

The co-

Defendants were denied their Fourth Amendment rights by Davis's
probation officers.

Hyatt never waived her protections.

All in all, the entire case cascaded from the officers1
lack of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

The officers

began their investigation of Davis based on his propinquity with
others.

The co-Defendants were never subject to or suspected of

possessing drugs or stolen property as alleged in this case.

ARGUMENT
A.

Preface.
As the Utah State Supreme Court has stated:
In Utah# the supreme court has, in addition to common
law power, constitutional authority to manage the
appellate process, Utah Const, art. V, § 1, art. VIII,
§§ 1, 4, as well as inherent supervisory authority over
all courts of this State. E.g., State v. Brown, 201
Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 7 (Nov. 30, 1992); State v. Gardner,
789 P.2d 273, 290 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State
v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 458 (Utah 1989); State v.
James, 767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah 1989); In re Criminal
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 653 (Utah 1988); State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 499 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in the result); In re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d
1076, 1081 (Utah 1985). Unless constrained by a
constitutional or statutory provision, we exercise our
powers to fashion standards of review that we think
best allocate responsibility between appellate and
trial courts in light of the particular determination
under review. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that
the allocation of responsibility, or discretion,
between trial and appellate courts is a matter of
peculiar and close importance to the courts in
question, and we see no reason why our authority to
define standards of review should not extend to cases
where the determination under review is a question of
federal law.
9

State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993).

The Thurman Court

went on to explain, in pertinent part:
It is widely agreed that the primary function of a
standard of review is to apportion power and,
consequently, responsibility between trial and
appellate courts for determining an issue or class of
issues. See, e.g., State v. Sykes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep.
35, 38 (Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1992) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 36
(D.C. 1989); Paul D. Carrington et al., Justice on
Appeal 130 (1976); Patrick W. Brennan, Standards of
Appellate Review, 33 Def. L.J. 377, 377 (1984); Ronald
R. Hofer, Standards of Review — Looking Beyond the
Labels, 74 Marq. L. Rev. 231, 232 (1991) [hereinafter
Hofer]; Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review,
85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 234-35 (1985) [hereinafter
Monaghan]. Put another way, a standard of review
allocates discretion between trial and appellate
courts. In determining the appropriateness of a
particular allocation of responsibility for deciding an
issue or class of issues, account should be taken of
the relative capabilities of each level of the court
system to take evidence and make findings of fact in
the face of conflicting evidence, on the one hand, and
to set binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other.
See, e.g.. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114-15
(1985); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 126-27
(3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Dauqhtrey, 874 F.2d
213, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. McConney,
728 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert,
denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Davis, 564 A.2d at 36-37.
In short, the choice of the appropriate standard of
review "turns on a determination that, as a matter of
the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor
is better positioned than another to decide the issue
in question." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,
559-60 (1988) (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 114); accord
Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1222
(1991). See generally Hofer at 237-41.
Id.

In other words, the Utah Supreme Court absent an expressed

Federal Law limiting the Courtfs power is free to govern itself
and rule on Utah matters free and clear of out-of-state
influences.

POINT I.
SERGEANT EVANS LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION

10

OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY TO INITIATE AN INVESTIGATION,
All searches by the police are per se illegal, unless
they are conducted pursuant to the authority of a warrant, or in
the alternative conducted pursuant to one of several specific
exceptions which have been enumerated by the court.

See, Katz v.

United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
The Utah State Constitution provides in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Const. Art. I § 14.
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2632, 66 L.Ed.2d
357 (1979) sets forth the principle that the Fourth Amendment
applies to all seizures of the person, including detention short
of traditional arrests. Whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
"seized" that person and the Fourth Amendment requires that the
seizure be reasonable.
The Supreme Court goes on to state that the
reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a
traditional arrest depends upon the "balance between the public
interest and the individualf s right to personal security free
from arbitrary interference by law officers."
To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a
seizure of a particular individual must be based upon
specific, objective facts indicating that society's
legitimate interests require the seizure of the
particular individual or that the seizure must be
carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit,
neutral limitation on the conduct of the individual
officer.
11

Brown v. Texas, Supra, p. 363, L.Ed.
In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed this requirement by acknowledging three
levels of police encounters with the public that are
constitutionally permissible:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic]
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not
detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed
or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop";
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed
or is being committed.
Id. at 617-18; quoting. United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223,
230 (5th Cir. 1984).
In State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213 (Utah 1991), a
S.W.A.T. team stopped and searched a vehicle entering a
cul-de-sac where the police were executing search warrants on
three houses. Although defendant had backed his truck up and
tried to leave after the S.W.A.T team had initially attempted to
detain him, the court held the totality of the circumstances did
not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the
truck was involved in criminal activity.
Id., at 216.
In addition to noting that the officers were not
uniformed, the court emphasized that there were no facts to link
this particular person to the suspected illegal activities in the
targeted houses. His mere presence in the area was insufficient
to support a reasonable suspicion. Id.

12

This point is further developed in a case with facts
almost identical to this case.

The Court in State v. Carpena,

714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) found that the stop of the defendant in
that case was an impermissible and unconstitutional stop.

In

Carpena an officer observed a slow moving vehicle in a
neighborhood at 3:00 a.m.
plates.

The vehicle had Arizona License

There had been a rash of burglaries reported in the

neighborhood/ however none this night.

The Court ruled:

We find that the district court did not err in
determining that the officer here had no
reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory
stop. The stop was based merely on the fact that
a car with out-of-state license plates was moving
slowly through a neighborhood late at night. The
officer had no objective facts on which to base a
reasonable suspicion that the men were involved in
criminal activity. The ruling of the district
court is affirmed.
Id.
In this case, Sergeant Evans stopped Davis because he
saw Davis drive his van down the back streets of Summit at 2:00
in the morning in a van with South Dakota plates.

Sergeant Evans

stop of Davis was unconstitutional and violative of Utah Code
Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended), which provides:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
Notwithstanding, Sergeant Evans indicated that his
suspicion of Davis was further established by his association
with a Mr. Blackburn at the Sunshine Truck Stop at Summit.
at 64-66.)

(TT.

The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Munsen, 821

P.2d 13 (1991), addressed this issue already.

The Court stated:

A "persons mere propinquity to others independently
13

suspected of criminal activity does not, without more,
give rise to probable cause to search that person."
Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91, 101 S. Ct. at 342. See Brown
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641
(1979) (mere presence in a neighborhood frequented by
drug users does not give rise to reasonable suspicion);
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593, 68 S. Ct.
222, 228 (1948) ("Presumptions of guilt are not lightly
to be indulged from mere meetings."); State v. Ramirez,
159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 14 (Utah 1991) (no reasonable
suspicion where man walking near defendant had run
away).
Id.

In Munsun the court states that the mere association with an

other person is not sufficient to create reasonable suspicion
that the defendant has violated the law.
not even much of an association.

In this case there is

The initial suspicion of the

officer is based upon driving down the road at 2 A.M. and then
going to a coffee shop (truck stop) thereafter being joined by
someone else (there was no physical contact between the two) is
not reasonable suspicion of anything.

There is no logical

manifestation of reasonable articulable facts which would lead a
reasonable officer to believe that Davis had violated the law at
the time Evans followed and stopped Davis and conducted his
conversations with Davis.

Davis was being suspected of criminal

activity simply by association.

When this information is

communicated to the agents of Adult Parole and Probation it does
not rise to a higher level of suspicion (by the mere fact that it
has been communicated to another agency) nor automatically create
constitutionally acceptable conduct by any of the police
agencies.

What Officer Evans observed in the early morning hours

does not automatically gain constitutional acceptance in the
early evening hours some 16 hours later, simply because it is now
retold to an agent of Adult Parole and Probation.
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The over

inquisitiveness of the police in this situation has been
addressed by the courts previously*

In State v. Sims, 808 P. 2d

141 (Utah Ct. App 1991) the court stated:
Troopers Howard and Mangelson testified at some
length about their expertise in drug interdiction,
and the trial court treated the roadblock as if
that was its primary purpose. However noble this
purpose might be, it was pursued by an
unauthorized means. The troopers each had years of
law enforcement experience, and can properly be
charged with awareness that their action was not
authorized by law. "The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding
(emphasis added)." Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 479, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Using ten to twelve
law officers to staff the roadblock may have also
left distant parts of the largely rural
jurisdiction with delayed police assistance in the
event of need. Thus, although it does not appear
that the officers behaved abusively toward those
stopped at the roadblock, this does not correct
the constitutional violation.
This sentiment is further clarified by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) when they
stated:
But while the preservation of order is important
to any society, the "needs of law enforcement
stand in constant tension with the Constitution's
protections of the individual against certain
excerises of official power. It is precisely the
predictability of these pressures that counsels a
resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards."
(citations omitted), (emphasis added)
The officers who went to search the residence of Davis/Hyatt were
following a hunch.

They were not possessed of any reasonable

articulabe suspicion that there was a violation of the law.
As this Court looks at the facts and the law as they apply
to Davis and Hyatt it should be blatantly obvious that nothing of
which the officers were aware rose to the level of either
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reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that either
Davis or Hyatt had violated the law.
MacArthyism died in the decade of the 1950s.

It was a dark

time in our history and we shouldn't return to such methods in
the prosecution of criminal offenses.
POINT II.
THE ILLEGAL USE OF THE PROBATION AGREEMENT
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
AFFORDING IN THE CONSTITUTIONS.
In 1991, the Utah Court of Appeals adopted the parole
reasonable suspicion standard in a probation context.
State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1262 (Utah 1983).

Citing,
The fact

that Davis was on probation is not cause enough in which to
search either Davis or Hyatt or any of their belongings including
vehicles and residence.
The probation officers were still required to
articulate a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed
or was about to be committed, see
205 (Utah App. 1991).

State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d

There was absolutely no indication that

either Davis or Hyatt were even remotely involved in any criminal
activity.

The search of the Davis/Hyatt residence and the

vehicles located there was not supported by any reasonable
articulable suspicion in the case of Davis or probable cause in
the case of Hyatt that either Davis or Hyatt had violated any
laws or that they were in the process of violating any laws or
that they were about to violate any laws. One critical
distinction must be noted here, and that is that Hyatt was not on
the probation and a search of her residence and personal property
must be supported by probable cause and/or a warrant issued by a
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neutral magistrate.

The search as it pertains to her possessions

and residence is, in deed, illegal per se.
The Court of Appeals addressed in State v. Harmon. 854
P.2d 1037 (Utah 1993) what was required to demonstrate voluntary
relinquishment of a Fourth Amendment protection.
Consent to search is valid under the Fourth Amendment
if (1) the consent was voluntarily given, and (2) the
consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the
prior illegality. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,
1262 (Utah 1993); Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 918. We apply
a correction of error standard when a defendant
challenges the "legal content" of the trial court's
ultimate conclusion that a consent was voluntary or
involuntary. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. The trial
court's factual findings will not be set aside unless
they are clearly erroneous. Id.; Barnhart, 210 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 35.
Whether consent to search was voluntarily given is
determined from the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the consent, including the characteristics
of the accused and the details of the police conduct.
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263; State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d
431, 437 (Utah App. 1990). In order for consent to be
voluntary, (1) there must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was unequivocal, specific,
and freely and intelligently given; (2) the government
must prove consent was given without duress or
coercion, express or implied; and (3) the courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver
of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be
convincing evidence that such rights were waived.
(emphasis added) State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah
App. 1990), aff'd. 1993 WL 176211 (1993).
Id.

In the case at bar, neither Davis nor Hyatt, especially

Hyatt, ever waived their Fourth Amendment protections.

The State

never demonstrated at any time that there was a knowing voluntary
waiver by either of the defendants herein of any constitutional
rights they have.

The search on the co-Defendants' residence and

personal property was illegal, thereby violating Article I, § 14
of the Utah State Constitution.

Pursuant to the Exclusionary

Rule said evidence should have been properly suppressed and not
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have been heard at the time of trial.
POINT III,
THE COURT WRONGFULLY CONVICTED DEFENDANT
DAVIS OF POSSESSION OF STOLEN GOODS,
In the case at bar there was not sufficient proof to
convict the defendant of possession of stolen property with the
intent to deprive the owner of said property.

When indeed there

was no proof presented at all that either of the tools were even
stolen!

One tool had been reported stolen more than a year prior

to being recovered at Defendant's home.

During the time the item

was stolen and recovered it could have passed through ten or
twenty hands.

The second item was never reported stolen and

there was NO testimony at all which would lead one to believe
that the stapler was stolen.

There was just no explanation as to

how the item had come to leave Gore Manufacturing.

"No

explanation" does not rise to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt".
These charges should have been dismissed by the Court at the
conclusion of the State's case in chief when defendant so moved.
The Court stated that it would not dismiss the charges when Judge
Braithewaite said:
"All right. If I was to sit on this case, I don't
know how far I'd go on the router. But I'm not
deciding this case, the jury is. With Mr.
Balduck's testimony, I think there's enough to
submit it to the jury. So that motion is denied.
(TT. 414).
THe Court also stated as to defense counsel's motion to dismiss
the charges against defendant Hyatt the court stated:
The motion is denied. We've just heard from two
witnesses [Balduck and Bentley] that said that
both of these defendants dealt drugs. (TT. 408).
The testimony of Danny Balduck and Blake Bentley was
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substantial in convicting defendants of any of the charges tried
at trial.

The prosecutor in this case, Scott Burns, told a

reporter for the local news paper (The Saturday Spectrum,
December 9, 1995, page 1, 11) that Danny Balduck played a very
important role in the conviction of the defendant, in the article
he said.
Burns said what he felt was the most damaging
evidence against Davis was the large amount of
drugs found at the scene and the testimony of an
inmate from the Utah State Prison in Draper.
Danny Balduck, who is in the Utah State
Prison for stealing an ATV [sic], testified that
the night that Davis was arrested, Balduck came to
his home to buy methamphetamine.
"We had an inmate testify that was why he
went to his house, to buy drugs," Burns said, "I
think this was very damaging."
At the time of trial the State (Scott Burns) stated:
Well, I also think that it is very relevant that
the testimony of Mr. Balduck and Mr. Bentley also
went to the possession of stolen property. (TT.
412)
This statement made to Judge Braithewaite, pursuant to a defense
motion, clearly points out the fact that the purpose of bringing
these two witnesses to court to testify was to prejudice the jury
and that the state INTENTIONALLY misrepresented their intentions
to Judge Braithewaite or in the alternative out and out lied to
Judge Braithewaite.

Judge Braithewaite had just asked Mr. Burns

to restate the purpose of the introduction of the testimony of
Balduck and Bentley and Scott Burns replied:
Identity, lack of mistake, modus operandi,
knowledge, ability — all of those things. (TT.
408)
This statement by Scott Burns absolutely contradicts his real
intent which was to present to the jury a series of events which
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had no bearing upon the charges before the court, nor the
question the jury was to decide, Scott Burns, INTENTIONALLY
either misled the court or out and out lied to it.

This is

clearly prosecutorial misconduct.
Neither Danny Balduck nor Blake Bentley should have played
any role in defendants1 trial.

Neither Danny Balduck nor Blake

Bentley had anything to testify to which would assist the jury to
determine whether or not defendant had possessed any controlled
substances with the intent to distribute or possessed any stolen
property with the intent to deprive the owner of the property on
November 21, 1994*

The issue before the court and the jury was

the violations alleged in the Information, not conduct on any
other occasion.

Further the testimony of Agent Eckman creates a

substantial risk that there was perjured testimony presented at
the time of trial.

At a minimum his testimony on at least two

prior occasions did not place Danny Balduck in the vehicle which
pulled up in front of defendant's home while the search was being
conducted.
CONCLUSION
In the case at bar there was not at any time a reasonable
suspicion articulated which would lead the probation officers to
believe that there had been a violation of law committed by
Davis.

The basis for the search of defendants1 vehicles and home

was innocent conduct observed by an officer under innocent
circumstances.

Further for the officers to search the home and

possessions of defendant Hyatt they would need to rise to the
level of probable cause, not just reasonable suspicion.

With the

increased level of constitutional protections afforded defendant
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Hyatt the basis for the Motion to Suppress becomes even greater
for her.

The search of defendants1 residence and vehicles was

clearly illegal under either standard, reasonable suspicion or
probable cause.

This Court should order the suppression of all

evidence seized pursuant to the illegal search.
The trial court erred in not dismissing the charges as to
theft.

The trial Court further erred in allowing Balduck and

Bentley to testify.

The misconduct of the prosecutor clearly

prejudiced the jury, even in the prosecutor's own opinion as
evidenced from the comments made by the prosecutor and as such
the convictions on all counts should be dismissed or in the
alternative overturned and remanded to the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

'S

day of

November, 1996.

D. BRUCE O L I V E R " ^
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants
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ADDENDA
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ADDENDUM A

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.

ADDENDUM R

Sec. 11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.

ADDENDUM C

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden - Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.

ADDENDUM D

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

ADDENDUM E

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

ADDENDUM F

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct;
exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by
the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character
trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in
a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

